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Background: General practitioners (GPs) in most high-income countries have a history of being independent private
providers with much autonomy. While GPs remain private providers, their autonomous position appears to be
challenged by increased policy regulations. This paper examines the extent to which GPs’ preferences for private
practice vs. salaried contracts changed in a period where a new health care reform, involving proposed increased
regulations of the GPs, was introduced.
Methods: We use data collected from Norwegian GPs through structured online questionnaires in December 2009
and May 2012.
Results: We find that the proportion of GPs who prefer private practice (i.e. the default contract for GPs in Norway)
decreases from 52% to 36% in the period from 2009 to 2012. While 67% of the GPs who worked in private practice
preferred this type of contract in 2009, the proportion had dropped by 20 percentage points in 2012. Salaried
contracts are preferred by GPs who are young, work in a small municipality, have more patients listed than they
prefer, work more hours per week than they prefer, have relatively low income or few patients listed.
Conclusion: We find that GPs’ preferences for private practice vs. salaried positions have changed substantially in the
last few years, with a significant shift towards salaried contracts. With the proportions of GPs remaining fairly similar
across private practice and salaried positions, there is an increasing discrepancy between GPs’ current contract and
their preferred one.
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General practitioners (GPs) in most high-income coun-
tries have a history of being independent private providers
with much autonomy. Rather than direct legal regulations,
policy makers have sought to steer GPs’ behavior through
financial incentives, including various blends of capitation,
fee for service (FFS), bonuses, and - more recently in
some countries - pay for performance (P4P) [1,2].
While GPs remain private providers, their autonomous
position appears to be threatened by increased regula-
tions [3-5]. In the words of J Fraser [5]: Internationally,
rising costs and increasing consumer and government ex-
pectations to monitor quality, contain costs, and integrate* Correspondence: jon.h.holte@uit.no
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unless otherwise stated.health services have increased regulation and reduced the
autonomy of GPs and other health care professionals. Au-
tonomy is known to be a key reason why GPs tradition-
ally have preferred private practice. Consequently, more
policy regulations are likely to be perceived as restrictions
or impediments to their freedom as self-employed med-
ical providers.
Whether the current remuneration and organization
schemes for GPs are in accordance with their preferences
is not well documented in the international research lit-
erature. In a study of last year medical students and
interns in Norway, B Abelsen and J Olsen [6] found that
only 20% of young doctors would prefer a fully activity
based remuneration contract like the existing one (2/3
FFS and 1/3 capitation). Previous international studies
suggest that salaried contracts may be important forhis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
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more, numerous studies show that there is preference
heterogeneity across subgroups of doctors, with females
in particular having stronger tendency to prefer salaried
contracts [6,11,12]. Still, the extent to which GPs’ prefer-
ences correspond with the contracts that are currently
being offered in general practice remains unclear.
Recruitment and retention of GPs constitute an im-
portant health policy concern in many high-income
countries where a generational shift takes place simul-
taneously with an increased demand for GP-services due
to an ageing population [6,13]. Clearly, contract type is
only one of many factors that influence recruitment and
retention [14,15]. Yet, considering that GPs and hospital
doctors currently are remunerated and organized in very
different ways (i.e. most GPs are private providers, while
most hospital doctors work on salaried contracts), it is
particularly important to ensure that the “alternative”
contracts offered in general practice are in accordance
with doctors’ preferences, otherwise it may be difficult
to recruit and retain skilled and motivated GPs.
The aim of this paper is to identify the extent to which
GPs’ preferences for private practice vs. salaried posi-
tions changed in a period where a new health care re-
form, involving proposed increased regulations of the
GPs, was introduced. The reform suggests a new role for
the GP including more “out of office” and interdisciplin-
ary work. The proposed regulations, which were intro-
duced in relation to the reform, involved increased
obligations in terms of accessibility, meeting attendance,
reporting and other administrative tasks. This will pro-
vide the municipalities with sufficient legal force to steer
GPs out of their office and into more interdisciplinary
work, in line with the aim of the reform. Not surpris-
ingly, the proposed regulations were met with heated
opposition among GPs and their union. About 3000 GPs
(i.e. 75% of all GPs) signed a letter of protest to the Min-
ster of Health and Care Services (http://tidsskriftet.no/
article/2505840). Beyond exploring the extent to which
GPs’ preferences have changed, we seek to identify fac-
tors associated with preferences of contract and to ex-
plain GPs’ preferences using data from open-ended
questions.
Institutional context
The Norwegian health care system is organised within
two sectors. Municipalities are responsible for primary
care, while specialist care is the responsibility of the
state (administered by four Regional Health Author-
ities). The two sectors have different funding mecha-
nisms, as well as different administrative, political and
professional cultures [16]. Recently, policy efforts have
been made to improve coordination between health
care providers [17].The payment systems for doctors are quite similar to
those of other OECD countries [18]. The vast majority
of Norwegian general practitioners (GPs) have private
practices and receive approximately one-third of their
incomes based on capitation (approximately NOK 400
(€50) as a flat rate per patient), paid by the municipal-
ities, and the remaining two-thirds based on FFS. The
FFS scheme is a mix of a fixed fee per consultation paid
by patients and variable fees paid by the government
depending on: the duration of the consultation, whether
certain types of examinations and laboratory tests are
initiated, and whether the doctor is a specialist in gen-
eral medicine [19].
Although private practice is the default option for GPs
in Norway, other options exists, especially in rural and
remote communities. One option is hired practice, in
which the municipalities provide offices space, equip-
ment and personnel for a negotiated fee, whereas the
GPs still receive capitation and FFS. Other options are
salaried positions with or without bonus. Fees for hired
practice, salary per hour and design of the bonus com-
ponent are all negotiated at the municipal level, and to
our knowledge there is no central data source, which
makes data on these contracts hard to obtain (there are
428 municipalities in Norway). Typically each municipal-
ity offers one type of contract, but some municipalities
offer salaried positions to young physicians with the
option to convert to private practice later. Unlike many
other OECD countries [18], the average payment levels
are higher among Norwegian GPs than among hospital
doctors [6].
Methods
Study design and questionnaire
We use data collected through structured online question-
naires in December 2009 and May 2012. All Norwegian
GPs were invited to participate in the survey of 2012,
while 3270 (81%) were invited to participate in 2009. The
remaining 19 percent in 2009 were excluded because they
participated in another study at the time. The total
number of GPs increased from 4049 to 4305 in the
period between the surveys. In the 2009 survey, GPs
received e-mailed invitations including an electronic
link to the questionnaire. In 2012, they were invited to
participate through a postal letter, in which they were
asked to access a webpage to answer the online question-
naire. The surveys were planned and executed independ-
ently of each other, but some of the questions from 2009
were included in 2012 to enable identification of changes
in GPs’ preferences for contract. Results from the 2009
survey have been published previously; see [20].
To map GPs’ current contracts, respondents were
asked which of the following options that best describes
their practice: (1) private practice in which the GP holds
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practice in which the GPs hire office space, equipment,
and/or staff from the municipality, (3) salary with bonus
arrangements, or (4) salary without bonus arrangement.
Subsequently, to identify GPs’ preferences for contract,
they were asked which of these options they would prefer
if they could choose freely. For these questions we used
exactly the same wording in 2009 and 2012. The listed
alternatives (1) – (4) correspond to the contracts that are
in use in Norway. The first option corresponds to the
default contract in Norway, while the supplementary
options are mainly offered to GPs in rural areas. In this
paper, alternative (1) will be referred to as private practice,
while alternative (2) will be referred to as hired practice.
GPs in private and hired practice are remunerated in the
same way, i.e. 1/3 capitation and 2/3 FFS.
In the 2012-survey some additional questions were
included to explain GPs’ preference for contract. As a
follow-up question on the question regarding preferred
contract, respondents were asked: Would your preferred
type of contract still apply if you could be assured that
the ability to control working hours, professional develop-
ment, professional autonomy, and income would be the
same in private practice (or salary, when that was the
stated preferred contract)? We deliberately made this
question contingent on ability to control working hours,
professional development etc. because these job attri-
butes are known to be important for GPs [14,21].a Thus,
the main purpose of this question was to investigate if
differences in any other attributes may contribute to
explain GPs’ preferences for contract. The respondents
were provided with three answering options: ‘yes’, ‘no’
and ‘indifferent’. Those who answered yes were asked
the following open-ended question: Why would you still
prefer private practice (or salary when that was the
stated preferred contract)?
Background variables were collected on age, gender,
list size, location and specialty attainment in both sur-
veys, as well as for income, working hours, preferred list
size and preferred working hours in 2012.
Data analysis
Descriptive statistics were used to describe the variables
of the study, including our main outcomes of interest,
i.e. GPs preferences for remuneration in 2009 and 2012.
A multinomial logistic regression model was applied to
identify factors associated with preferences for contract
type, using data from 2012. The dependent variable
‘preferences for contract’ was set as categorical with
three categories: private practice (1), hired practice (2)
and salaried position (3) or (4). The first category (pri-
vate practice) was treated as the reference in the ana-
lysis. The following covariates were included in the
multivariate regression analysis: age, gender, income,specialty attainment, location, list size, working hours,
discrepancy between preferred and actual list size, dis-
crepancy between preferred and actual working hours.
Data were analyzed on STATA version 12.
Answers to the open-ended question ‘Why would you
still prefer private practice (salaried contract)?’ were sorted
into categories. We used human coding as one of the re-
searchers read every response, identified different themes,
and then multi-coded the responses into different categor-
ies. Another researcher followed the same procedure and
the two agreed on the choice of categories. A representa-
tional approach was used in the coding process attempt-
ing to map the meaning intended by its source [22].
We use four categories to cover the meanings intended
by the responses among those preferring private practice
(autonomy, more income, aversion to public authorities,
other reasons), and five categories to cover meanings
intended by the responses among those preferring salar-
ied positions (better social security, less administrative
work, less employer responsibility, less economic focus,
and more stability).
Ethics
All respondents were informed, through the invitation
letter, about the objectives and methods of the study. It
was emphasized that participation was voluntary, and
that respondents were free to withdraw from the study
at any time. The research project was reported to the
Data Protection Official for Research (NSD), and was
carried out in accordance with existing licenses (e.g. the
Personal Data Act). The study does not require approval
by the Regional Committees for Medical and Health




Responses were obtained from 1304 GPs (40% of those
e-mailed) in the 2009-survey and 1275 GPs (30% of all
Norwegian GPs) in the 2012-survey. In both surveys the
respondents were largely representative of Norwegian
GPs with respect to age, gender, location and list size,
while specialists in general medicine appears to be over-
represented (see Table 1). They worked on average
45 hours per week, but would prefer only 38 hours
according to data from 2012. While they preferred to
work shorter hours, only 18% of them preferred shorter
list size. On average the preferred list size was only 38
patients less than the mean actual list size (1108 vs.
1152). Furthermore, our estimates suggest that GPs earn
an average of around NOK 1 050 000 a year, and that
there is substantial income variations. (This is gross tax-
able income after deducting operating costs and national






n = 1 308 n = 1 275
Age 47 48 492
Female 36% 37% 35%2
Municipality
<5 000 13% 16% 14%1
5 000–49 999 55% 53% 52%1
50 000+ 32% 31% 34%1
Specialty attainment 66% 70% 55%3
List size (mean) 1 209 1152 1 1822
Preferred list size (mean) 1108
Discrepancy between preferred
and actual list size
Fewer patients listed than preferred 18%
No discrepancy 42%
More patients listed than preferred 41%





and actual working hours
Work fewer hours than preferred 2%
No discrepancy 20%
Work more hours than preferred 78%
Current practice
Private practice 75% 71%
Hired practice 18% 20%
Salary with bonus 4% 4%
Salary without bonus 3% 6%
Incomea
< NOK 700 000 - 10% -
NOK 700 000 – 849 000 - 17% -
NOK 850 000 – 999 000 - 20% -
NOK 1 000 000 – 1 149 000 - 17% -
NOK 1 150 000 – 1 299 000 - 18% -
NOK 1 300 000 – 1 500 000 - 10% -
> NOK 1 500 000 - 8% -
Mean income (SD)b 1 051 000 (298 000)
1Statistics Norway (www.ssb.no accessed 24th of March 2011).
2https://helsedirektoratet.no/statistikk-og-analyse/fastlegestatistikk.
3http://legeforeningen.no/Emner/Andre-emner/Legestatistikk/.
Note: Right and left column is copied from [20] agross taxable income after
deducting operating costs and national insurance costs (pension, sick pay etc.)
bMean income is constructed from the mid-points of the selected income
range for each GP.
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the distributions of GPs into different contracts. In 2012,
71% worked in a private practice, 20% worked in a ‘hired
practice’, 4% worked in salaried practice with bonuses,
while 6% worked in salaried practice without bonuses.
Private practitioners (including those who work in hired
practice) earn around 15% (NOK 130 000) more than
fixed salaried GPs on average (see Additional file 1).
However, the variation in income within each contract
(e.g. SD NOK 302 000 for GPs in private practice)
appears to be much larger than the variation across
contracts.
Preferences for contract
Table 2 shows GPs’ preferences for contract, both the
total figures and split within their current contract type.
Note the decrease from 52% to 36% in the proportion of
GPs who prefer private practice (i.e. the default contract
for GPs). The proportion who prefer salary with bonuses
increases from 16% to 24%, while the proportion prefer-
ring salary without bonuses doubles from 6% to 12%, i.e.
the proportion preferring a salaried position increases
from 22% to 36%. All these differences are statistically
significant.
A closer look at preference shifts depending on current
contract suggests a particularly strong altering of prefer-
ences within the private practice group. While 67% of
them preferred this contract type in 2009, the proportion
had dropped by 20 percentage points in 2012. Among
those with hired practice, the support for their current
contract dropped from 69% to 57%, with a corresponding
preference shift towards salaried alternatives. The highest
satisfaction with status quo, as well as the highest prefer-
ence stability, can be seen in the subgroup Salary with
bonus. In the subgroup Salary without bonus we note an
increased preference for having bonus option.
Table 3 shows results from the multinomial logistic
regression model estimated on the basis of the sample
from 2012, to identify factors associated with preferences
for contract. GPs who work in a small municipality and
those who have few patients listed are more likely to
prefer hired practice over private practice, compared to
those with opposing characteristics. Furthermore, GPs
who are young; work in a small municipality; have
relatively low income; few patients listed, or excessive
workload (i.e. more patients listed or more working
hours than desired), are significantly more likely to pre-
fer salary over private practice. We find no statistically
significant association between gender, working hours or
specialty attainment, and preferences for contract in the
multivariate regression model.
Table 4 shows responses to the follow-up question in
the 2012 survey: Would your preferred type of contract
still apply if you could be assured that the ability to
Table 2 Preferred practice organization and remuneration among Norwegian GPs
Year Preferred practice (row %) Total n
Private practice Hired practice1 Salary with bonus Salary without bonus
(95% CI) (95% CI) (95% CI) (95% CI)
Total 2009 52 (49–55) 26 (24–29) 16 (14–18) 6 (5–7) 100 1294
2012 36 (33–38) 29 (27–32) 24 (22–26) 12 (10–14) 100 1262
Current practice
Private practice 2009 67 17 13 3 100 964
2012 47 25 18 10 100 892
Hired practice1 2009 10 69 17 4 100 238
2012 10 57 25 8 100 245
Salary with bonus 2009 2 6 73 19 100 48
2012 4 4 78 14 100 49
Salary without bonus 2009 2 9 32 57 100 44
2012 4 8 45 43 100 76
1The GP runs a private practice in which premises, equipment, and/or staff are hired from the municipality.
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sional autonomy, and income, would be the same in pri-
vate practice (or salaried position)? The majority of
those who initially preferred private practice answered
that they would either prefer salary (35%) or be indiffer-
ent between salary and private practice (27%) if the listed
job attributes would be the same in a salaried position.
In contrast, only a small minority of those who initially
preferred salary answered that they would change per-
ception if they could be assured that the listed job attri-
butes would be the same in private practice.
Social security/benefits, administrative work and em-
ployer responsibility were frequently mentioned reasons
why GPs would still prefer a salaried position even if the
listed job attributes were equal in private practice (see
Table 5). The most frequently mentioned reason for pre-
ferring private practice was autonomy, i.e. many respon-
dents did not seem to be assured that autonomy could
possibly be the same in a salaried position.
Discussion
GPs’ preferences for private practice vs. salaried posi-
tions have changed substantially in the last few years,
with a significant shift towards salaried positions. With
the proportions of GPs remaining fairly similar across
the four contract types, there is an increasing discrep-
ancy between GPs’ current contract and their preferred
one.
Variation in GPs’ preferences: who wants salaried
positions?
Young and female GPs are overrepresented among those
who prefer salaried positions (see crude percentages in
Table 2). These findings are particularly noteworthy con-
sidering that a generational shift in the GP population isunderway and the share of female doctors is rapidly
increasing. The association between gender and prefer-
ences for contract is not found to be statistically signifi-
cant after controlling for other characteristics in the
multivariate regression analysis. Thus, gender differences
in the other variables (e.g. list size and income) seem to
explain why females are more inclined than males to
prefer salary. Similar results were obtained in the regres-
sion model based on the sample from 2009 [20].b
Those who live in small municipalities are consider-
ably more likely to prefer salaried positions. This comes
as no surprise since the population base in many small
municipalities is too small to make the list patient sys-
tem with fully activity based remuneration lucrative.
Moreover, GPs in small municipalities tend to have more
out of office responsibilities, which may be less compat-
ible with the default remuneration system. For this rea-
son, salaried contracts are offered to GPs in rural areas.
This finding concurs with results from international
studies suggesting that salaried contracts may be par-
ticularly important for recruitment to rural general prac-
tice [7-10].
As expected, income is an important determinant for
GPs contract preferences. For example, those who earn
less than NOK 850 000 are three times more likely to
prefer salary compared to those who earn more than
NOK 1 150 000, (after controlling for differences in hours
and all the other independent variables). They might
think that the efforts involved in running a private prac-
tice do not yield sufficient financial returns.
Furthermore, GPs who have more patients listed than
they prefer and work more hours per week than they
prefer are more likely to prefer salary over private prac-
tice. These findings suggest that the workload they asso-
ciate with salaried contracts better correspond with their
Table 3 Multinomial regression analysis: factors associated with GPs preferences for practice form
Variables GPs preferring hired
practice, row %




24-37 59% (72/123) 1,564 70% (120/171) 2,315***
38-47 47% (81/173) 1,333 60% (140/232) 2,169***
48-57 43% (102/240) 1,170 36% (78/216) 0,822
>58 38% (78/203) 1 39% (80/205) 1
Gender
Female 48% (114/233) 0,949 62% (198/317) 1,188
Male 43% (219/506) 1 43% (220/507) 1
Inhabitants in practice municipality
0-5 000 80% (57/71) 4,221*** 75% (170/226) 6,115***
5 000-14 999 58% (96/165) 1,674** 58% (104/180) 1,300
15 000-49 999 33% (78/238) 0,694* 45% (99/221) 0,658**
>50 0000 38% (102/265) 1 23% (45/197 1
Specialist
No 57% (105/183) 1,300 68% (165/243) 1,163
Yes 41% (228/556) 1 44% (253/581) 1
Income (NOK)
<850 000 57% (86/152) 1,256 72% (168/234) 3,073***
850 000–1 149 999 43% (120/277) 0,929 51% (163/320) 1,593**
>1 149 999 41% (127/310) 1 32% (87/270) 1
List size
0-999 66% (110/166) 2,834*** 88% (99/113) 4,357***
1 000-1 199 49% (74/150) 1,735** 59% (101/170) 2,407***
1 200-1 399 41% (84/206) 1,379 38 (99/259) 1,724**
>1 400 30% (65/217) 1 42% (119/282) 1
Discrepancy between preferred and actual list size
Fewer patients listed than pref. 54% (68/125) 0,965 58% (79/136) 0,773
No discrepancy 42% (133/314) 1 47% (158/339) 1
More patients listed than pref. 44% (132/300) 1,348* 52% (181/349) 1,920***
Working hours
<37.6 54% (56/103) 1,371 61% (75/122) 1,153
37.6 – 45 45% (132/293) 1,186 53% (182/343) 1,223
46-52 41% (93/227) 1,002 43% (103/237) 0,952
>52 45% (52/116) 1 48% (58/122) 1
Discrepancy between preferred and actual working hours
Work fewer hours than preferred 67% (8/12) 1,979 79% (15/19) 3,284*
No discrepancy 42% (66/156) 44% (72/162) 1
Work more hours than preferred 45% (259/571) 1,507* 51% (331/643) 1,862***
Constant 0,204*** 0,074***
Log-Likelihood −1 114,72
Number of observations 1 157
Base level: private practice ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 1Relative Risk Ratio.
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Table 4 Would your preferred organization and
remuneration system still apply if you could be assured
the ability to control working hours, professional
development, professional autonomy, and income would
be the same in private practice/a salaried position?









Yes 38 21 78 86
No1 35 54 7 8
Indifferent 27 25 14 5
Total 100 100 100 100
N 447 362 300 147
1Would prefer salary if preferred system is private or hired practice and private
practice if preferred is salary.
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from an activity based payment system (i.e. 78% work
more hours than they prefer and 41% have more patients
listed).c Notably, the association between (actual) work-
ing hours and preferences for contract is not found to
be significant. Thus, the number of hours worked per se
does not appear to be decisive for GPs contract prefer-
ences. The list size, however, remains a significant ex-
planatory factor, i.e. the likelihood of preferring salary
decreases with increasing list size.
Possible explanations for shift in preferences
It seems plausible that the abrupt change in GPs’ prefer-
ences for private practice vs salaried positions is influ-
enced by the proposed policy regulations, which were
introduced to achieve the aims of a new health care
reform, i.e. get the GPs out of their office and into more
interdisciplinary work. The proposal challenged the GPsTable 5 Why would you still prefer salary/private
practice?1
Variables n Percent
Reasons for preferring Private practice2
Autonomy 114 46%
More income 34 14%
Aversion to public authorities, bureaucracy etc. 46 19%
Other reasons 18 7%
Reasons for preferring salaried positions3
Better social security/benefits 182 50%
Less administrative work 128 35%
Less employer responsibility 81 22%
Less economic focus 43 12%
More stability 49 14%
1The respondents were allowed to provide multiple reasons to this question
276 GPs, of those who preferred private practice (N = 248), did not provide an
answer to this question. 390 GPs, of those who preferred salaried position
(N = 362), did not provide an answer to this question.autonomous position through increased obligations in
terms of accessibility, meeting attendance, reporting and
other administrative tasks. Autonomy is known to be a
key reason why GPs traditionally have preferred private
practice. Thus, the proposal suggests reducing one of
the main attractions associated with private practice.
This may have altered the net benefit of being self-
employed (rather than salaried) from positive to negative
for many doctors. However, other aspect of the reform
may also contribute to explain the shift in preferences.
Particularly, it might be that the GPs perceive the new
responsibilities implied by the reform (i.e. more out of
office work and interdisciplinary work), which is more
time consuming and difficult to measure, to be less com-
patible with the current default contract.
The proposal for regulations was released in 2011, but
it was not yet adopted at the time of the study. The work
of implementing the reform started January 1 2012.
However, the content of the reform was already known
in December 2009, and the reform was still in an early
stage of being implemented in May 2012. Thus, the
release and execution of the reform and the proposed
regulations cannot be considered as exogenous shocks
occurring between the 2009-survey and the 2012-survey.
Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume that these
events may contribute to explain the pronounced shift
in GPs’ preferences within a short period of time.d
Other factors may also contribute to explain the shift
in preferences. First, it appears that the operating costs
of running a private practice had increased without
being offset by corresponding revenue increases in fees
and per-capita grants. Second, younger doctors were in
2011 excluded from the sickness and pension scheme
for doctors. While they still have sick pay rights, they
now need to sign private insurance for pension. Al-
though these events evoked far less attention and oppos-
ition compared to the proposed policy regulations, they
were subject of debate in the medical community.
Discrepancy between preferred and current contract:
policy implications
The growing dissatisfaction among GPs with their
current default contract might raise policy concern prin-
cipally in two different ways. First, if it becomes difficult
to recruit and retain GPs based on this contract. Second,
if it results in suboptimal performance.
So far, recruitment and retention have primarily been
a problem in rural municipalities, where alternative
payment contracts already exist [23]. The need for
GPs is, however, expected to increase substantially in
the next years because of a generational shift in the
GP population, combined with increased demand for
GP-services due to an ageing population [24]. This
development will further enhance the challenge of
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may also make it difficult to recruit and retain GPs in
urban areas, where private practice is offered as the
default contract. Anecdotal evidence suggest that GPs
in urban areas, particularly young females, recently
have quit their jobs because of dissatisfaction with the
current organization and remuneration system [25].
This finding is noteworthy since the majority of young
doctors are women. However, the growing dissatisfac-
tion with the current default contract is not likely to
result in a severe overall shortage of GPs since the
number of doctors in Norway exceeds the number of
medical positions in hospitals by a wide margin, i.e.
many doctors will probably be “forced’ into general
practice in the absence of other opportunities.e
A more likely scenario, if policy makers refuse to offer
contracts in alignment with the diversity in doctors’
preferences, is that general practice, which previously
has been a popular specialty in Norway, evolves to loose
its recognition and status. This can have a variety of
adverse effects. For example, it may become difficult to
retain GPs over time, as suggested by LT Kongsvik [25].
Still, winding up a private practice might be costly and
take time, so once established it might be for the long
run.
Undesirable selection effects can also occur, i.e. it may
become difficult to recruit and retain some of those
interested and motivated to work as GPs, as they may be
deterred by the current contract. This can have negative
effects on the productivity and/or the quality of services
provided in general practice. More research into this
topic is required.
Concerning GPs performance, dissatisfaction with the
current contract may potentially have (direct) negative
effects, i.e. it might be that those who are dissatisfied
with the current contract would have behaved more
closely in alignment with policy makers’ objectives if
they were allowed to work on salaried contracts. It
should be worrisome to policy makers if GPs’ dissatisfac-
tion with their current contract were to create a frustra-
tion that might divert them from their professional code
of conduct. This aspect seems to be largely ignored in
the literature on effects of remuneration systems.
Expected effects of offering salary
There is a vast literature on how remuneration systems
affect physicians’ practice. Most studies find activity based
payment schemes (such as FFS and capitation) to be asso-
ciated with higher output/activity [11,26,27]. It is not fully
understood whether the observed association is explained
mainly by selection effects (i.e. variable remuneration
schemes attract workers who are more productive) or
incentive effects (i.e. variables payment schemes causes
workers to be more productive than they otherwise wouldbe under fixed payment schemes). It is hard to separ-
ate these effects in field studies which typically lack
sufficient data on worker’s preferences and attitudes.
However, the existing evidence suggest that both ef-
fects play an important role in explaining observed
differences in output across variable and fixed remu-
neration schemes [11,28-30]. Our findings that high
income earners and those with many patients listed
are more likely to prefer private practice correspond
to the findings from previous studies, i.e. activity
based remuneration schemes are preferred by workers
who are more able and/or more income motivated.
Also the findings that those who work more hours
and have more patients listed than desired prefer sal-
aried contracts might potentially be explained by dif-
ferences in productivity, i.e. those who struggle with
excessive workload are likely to be less productive (on
average) than those who manage to control their
workload.
The effect on productivity of offering salary to the GPs
who prefer salary depends on the extent to which these
doctors are responsive to the financial incentives in the
current remuneration scheme, i.e. the magnitude of the
incentive effect for this particular group of doctors. Our
findings that those who prefer salary over private prac-
tice have fewer patients’ listed and lower earnings seem
to suggest that this particular group of doctors only to a
limited extent is responsive to financial incentives, i.e. it
appears that they are willing to trade income for more
manageable workload. However, the observed variations
in list size and income could also potentially be ex-
plained by variations in ability and capacity among GPs.
Neither can we rule out that those who preferred sal-
aried contracts would have become more productive if
they had been allowed to work on salaried contracts. To
run a private practice against one’s own will is obviously
demanding, and it could potentially take a lot of energy
and focus away from the core tasks of being a doctor.
More research into this topic is required.
Still, reduced productivity might be an inevitable con-
sequence of offering greater variety in contracts, includ-
ing alternatives with less financial uncertainty, to recruit
and retain sufficient number of GPs. The findings that
those who work more hours and have more patients
listed than they desire are more inclined to prefer salary,
suggests that many prefer salary because they want to
reduce their current workload. Offering salary with
bonus, which seem to be a popular alternative among
our respondents, may contribute to reduce the potential
risk of negative effects associated with salaried contracts.
Finally, an important caveat should be noted to the lit-
erature suggesting that GPs’ productivity is reduced
when salaried. These studies are usually based on prod-
uctivity measures related to consultations and services
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that the seemingly less productive salaried GPs take
more time with their patients and reduce unnecessary,
i.e. unproductive, referrals to specialists. Hence, when
studying how alternative GP payment contracts affect
productivity, it is crucial to account for the productiv-
ity of the wider health services, i.e. to include the re-
source use generated by GPs referrals.Generalizability
Responses were obtained from 1304 GPs (40%) in the
2009-survey and 1275 GPs (30%) in the 2012-survey.f
Compared to similar recent studies these response rates
seem satisfactory [31]. Furthermore, and most import-
antly, our respondents appear to be largely representa-
tive with regard to most background characteristics, e.g.
age, gender, geographical distribution. Still, we cannot
entirely rule out that there are systematic unobserved
differences between the 2009-sample and the 2012-
sample. For example, it could be an issue that those who
were most dissatisfied with the reform, which was about
to be implemented in 2012, were most inclined to
answering the survey. However, considering that the
respondents from the two surveys were almost identical
according to all observed characteristics, which are
strongly associated with preferences for contract, it does
not seem likely that it interferes with our key results to a
significant extent.g
The recent changes in the organization of GPs in
Norway, which appear to have altered their preferences
in favor of salaried positions, are similar to changes
introduced in a number of other countries where the
majority of GPs are private providers [3-5]. Thus, we
believe the results from this study are relevant to other
contexts and countries. Regardless of what is causing the
shift in preferences, our study illustrates the importance
of surveying GPs’ preferences for contract type. Notably,
we find no other international studies that have exam-
ined the extent to which GPs’ preferences for contract
type match the existing remuneration and organization
systems. More research on this topic is warranted.Conclusion
We find that GPs’ preferences for private practice vs.
salaried positions have changed substantially in the last
few years, with a significant shift towards salary con-
tracts. The emerging pattern of altered preferences is
one involving less financial uncertainty. Less than half of
the GPs who worked in a private practice (i.e. the default
contract for GPs in Norway) in 2012 prefer this contract
type. These findings suggest that health authorities may
do well in offering more diversity in organization and
remuneration schemes.Endnotes
aThe relative importance of the listed job attributes
were explored in the 2012-survey using a discrete choice
experiment. The results from the experiment will be
published in a separate paper.
bResults from regression analysis using data from 2009
are presented in Halvorsen et al. [20]. The results from
2009 and 2012 are not directly comparable for several
reasons: 1) Income, working hours, discrepancy between
preferred and actual list size and discrepancy between
preferred and actual working hours were not included as
covariates in Halvorsen et al. Data on these variables
were not collected in the 2009 survey. 2) The dependent
variable ‘preferences for contract’ was dichotomized into
private and salary in the analysis based on the 2009-
sample, while we use three categories in this paper (as
explained in the Methods sections). This approach pro-
vides more nuanced information about GPs preferences
for the default remuneration system (private practice) vs.
other available remuneration schemes (hired practice
and salaried positions), and it is feasible to use this sub-
division in 2012 since we have roughly 1/3 of the
respondents belonging to each group.
cIn fact, those working fewer hours than preferred also
prefer salary, although this is only significant at the 10%
level. Such remuneration preferences in this admittedly
very small subgroup might be explained by a combin-
ation of having recently set up a practice, with too few
patients to fill the day, and hence provide an acceptable
pay.
dGiven that the shift in GPs’ preferences indeed was a
consequence of the proposed regulations it might be that
their preferences have changed after the 2012-survey,
because the proposal was modified, to some extent,
before it was adopted. Some of the most invasive mea-
sures were removed or modified to accommodate the
massive opposition from the GPs and their union, but
also the adopted regulations (which have been in effect
from 1 January 2013) involved increased obligations for
the GPs in terms of accessibility, meeting attendance,
reporting and other administrative tasks, which are likely
to be perceived as impediments to their freedom as self-
employed medical providers.
eIn the proposal for the coordination reform it is
stated that the government will ensure that the expected
growth in medical positions (i.e. annual net inflow of
about 600 doctors to the health service in the next few
years) mainly occurs in municipalities, by the means of
strict regulation of new medical positions in hospitals.
fApproximately 30% of all Norwegian GPs answered
each survey (32% in 2009 and 30% in 2012) despite con-
siderable differences in the response rates. The reason is
that all Norwegian GPs were invited to participate in the
2012-survey, while only 81% were invited in 2009.
Holte et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2015) 15:119 Page 10 of 10gAnother possible source of bias is that the 2009-
survey was issued through the Norwegian Medical Asso-
ciation’s (NMA) own research institute, i.e. the Institute
for Studies of the Medical Profession, while the 2012-
survey was conducted as an independent survey. Hence,
it is conceivable that those who responded to the survey
in 2009 are greater supporters of the medical association
than those who responded in 2012, meaning that they
might have preferences more closely in line with the
NMA’s official views. This is a particular concern in the
current study since the NMA is known to support the
private practice system. However, the vast majority of
the Norwegian doctors are members of the NMA (i.e.
97% of all doctors in the age bellow 67 years). Thus,
although the degree of support may vary, most GPs
support the association in the form of membership.
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